



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTATION PROGRAM:
THE ARMY RESERVE**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) program provides the single most responsive and flexible source of reserve component manpower for the full spectrum of threats and responses this nation faces today and well into the next century. While the intent of this critical force multiplier was envisioned to prime-the-pump and provide those units and agencies with a responsive and trained manpower pool during the early days of a crisis, the IMA program never met it's intent. The IMA program failures were attributed to inconsistencies in the laws, policies and regulations that generated turbulence and superfluous complexity, which failed to enhance the program's flexibility and accessibility to the reserve component. Steps can be undertaken to reduce IMA program turbulence through stabilizing end strength and funding while removing institutional impediments whereby law and policy matches the intent of the IMA program. We must be willing to make changes in our traditional expectations of accessibility to IMAs with greater flexibility and surge capacity for the types of missions and deployment timelines envisioned by our senior leadership. This paper will address the essential vision-to-resourcing deficiencies and recommend changes that will be needed if the IMA program is to stay relevant and responsive to meet the challenges of our nation and the national military strategy.

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Individual Mobilization Augmentees

Operation Desert Storm was the first opportunity for the Army's Individual Mobilization Augmentees to contribute to a major mobilization and deployment.¹ An Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) is a member of the selected reserve who is preassigned to augment an active component organization upon mobilization. The premise is that additional personnel, coping with an expanded workload during an emergency, could be obtained from the Army Reserve when needed. The value of an IMA is enhanced by preassignment to a specific unit, training with the unit, and in effect becoming an integral part of the unit before an emergency. The program relies solely on reserve soldiers volunteering to become IMAs. As the overall active force declines and statutory force structure limits continue, individual specialty skills within that force structure will continue to decline. Obtaining a balanced force mix will be difficult and our ability for surge capacity will not be responsive to the types of missions and deployment timelines envisioned by our senior leadership. This paper will analyze the essential "vision-to-resourcing" deficiencies and recommend changes that will be needed if the IMA program is to stay relevant and responsive to meet the challenges of our nation and the national military strategy.

The IMA Program

The IMA program was established in 1981 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide a means to augment active component structure of the Department of Defense or other departments or agencies of the U.S. government, which must be filled to support mobilization (including pre-and/or post-mobilization) requirements, contingency operations, operations other than war, or specialized or technical requirements.² IMAs are assigned against validated positions that are identified on active component structure documents (MTOE/MOBTDA) for fill by Reserve Component soldiers.³ The Service Secretaries of the Military Departments validate, prioritize, and approve IMA requirements within their services. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs ensures that IMA requirements for OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff review and approve the Unified Combatant Command IMA requirements. All IMA requirements are sent to the Service Secretaries for review and resourcing options. IMAs, as Selected Reserve Members, are subject to immediate involuntary order to active duty whenever a Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC) is invoked under Title 10, United States Code, (USC) Chapter 1209, Section 12303, and

also under a declaration of war or national emergency by the President or Congress under Title 10, USC, Chapter 1209, Section 12301(a) for full mobilization and Section 12303 for partial mobilization.⁴

IMA soldiers are required to perform a minimum of 12 days of annual training (AT) per year with their assigned Active Component units.⁵ While the scope and nature of this training is largely determined by the unit, all training is focused on those specific duties and responsibilities the soldier will be expected to perform when ordered to active duty. The OSD IMA program made it possible for all of the Armed Forces to have IMAs who could be called early under the Presidential, section 12304, authority and who could be paid for attending annual training or training assemblies with their Active Component unit for which they were assigned.⁶ Essentially, OSD adopted an Air Force system that had worked well for years was made available for the other services.⁷ The Army, however, chose not to use all of its newly gained authority for IMAs. IMA training is funded by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) to the extent necessary to support the overall objectives of the IMA program.⁸ Since the intent of the OSD program was to promote familiarity with not only a specific unit but with a specific wartime job in that unit, the Army program fell short of OSD aspirations.⁹ Figure 1 shows the Army IMA program strength from 1980 to 1990. Nevertheless, by 1988, the Army IMA program was expanded from 6,416 to 12,126 soldiers. By June 1990, just prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Army had a total of 20,329 IMAs positions (spaces) required in mobilization documents but only had 14,189 IMA soldiers (faces) on the books, a 70% fill, but, in reality, only 60% were fully trained. Figure 2 shows the composition of the Army IMA program in June 1990.¹⁰

Army IMA Program Strength

	Officers	Enlisted	Total
1980	6,236	180	6,416
1981	6,536	445	6,981
1982	7,288	399	7,687
1983	7,472	634	8,106
1984	8,128	1,655	9,783
1985	8,541	2,583	11,124
1986	8,275	4,322	12,597
1987	8,074	4,864	12,938
1988	8,802	3,324	12,126
1989	9,632	2,976	12,608
1990	10,945	3,244	14,189

Army IMA Strength Prior to DESERT STORM

General	31
Colonel	824
Lt Colonel	2,875
Major	3,360
Captain	2,382
Lieutenant	913
Total:	10,385
Warrant Officer	560
Sergeant Major	143
Master Sergeant	515
Sgt First Class	871
Staff Sergeant	820
Sergeant	845
Specialist & PFC	50
Total:	3,244
Total IMAs:	14,189

FIGURE 2

The IMA Call-Up for Desert Storm

Utilization of IMAs by the Army in response to Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was not to the level as originally envisioned by the program managers. The original intent of the IMA program was that these personnel would report automatically to their Active Component units upon declaration of a national emergency or war, in which it was assumed there would be no ceilings on the numbers of selected reservists that could be ordered to active duty. Only 17% of the IMAs were used in one way or another in augmenting their Active Component units during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.¹¹ A total of 2,364 IMAs were brought to active duty from August 1990 through August 1991. Many post Desert Storm studies have highlighted the reasons for this low utilization of IMAs. But three issues continually surfaced; first, the administrative process in getting an IMA soldier called up was cumbersome, second, there were delays in the initial PRC allocations and third, poor utilization of the IMA based on planned requirements versus use and the pre-trained soldier versus just a body. The lack of authority to call up IMAs involuntarily meant Active Component units could not simply telephone their IMAs and tell them to report for duty. The Army's share of the PRC during the early stages of Desert Shield equated to only 1500 IMA authorizations from August 1990 through December 1990.¹² These incremental PRC strength ceilings meant that IMAs had to compete in priority with other Reserve Component troop units required by CENTCOM during the initial stages of

Desert Shield. The third issue was in the poor utilization of IMAs by the organization to which they were assigned. That is not to say IMAs did not contribute to the war effort, but rather they were used to meet personnel requirements that under pre-war plans were supposed to have been met from other sources of pretrained individuals.¹³ Instead of doing the specific job they had trained to perform in the organization, there was a great deal of force structure improvisation. To put this in perspective, HQDA made little use of its 803 IMAs, with only 176 being called to active duty. There were entire major staff sections on the Army Staff that did not use their IMAs for which force structure, authorizations, and training relationships were planned. Were the IMAs not responsive to the nation's needs as they originally envisioned to act as a resource in priming-the-pump of mobilization? What is most striking is CENTCOM -the lead operator- used only 49 of its assigned 134 IMAs (37%) considering the after-action reports that the headquarters was understaffed at the outset and required considerable augmentation. It should be noted that over 700 IMA volunteers served on Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD) during the initial weeks.¹⁴ The use of TTAD funds for IMAs was limited to each Active Component's available budget. Keep in mind that the end of the DOD fiscal year was less than 60 days in early August 1990 and that the OCAR budget for IMA Annual Training (12 days) had already been expended. The overall utilization rate of 17% of IMAs was disappointing considering the level of mobilization undertaken by the Army indicates a serious force structure flaw. Figure 3 shows the DOD IMA program utilization for Operation Desert Storm. Figure 4 shows Utilization of IMAs by Major Army Command and Figure 5 shows the distribution of IMAs by Command and duty status.¹⁵

DOD IMA Programs for Operation DESERT STORM

Armed Force	Pre-War Strength	Percent of AC	Number Used	Participation Rate
Army	14,165	1.8%	2,364	17%
Navy	2,516	0.4%	262	10%
Air Force	13,315	2.3%	2,334	18%
Marine Corps	1,330	6.7%	856	64%

FIGURE 3

Utilization of IMAs by Army Major Commands

Army Major Command	IMAs Assigned	IMAs Utilized	Utilization Rate (%)
Personnel Command	90	109	121 %
Forces Command	623	515	83 %
Criminal Investigation Command	167	107	64 %
Military Traffic Management Command	206	93	45 %
Health Services Command	2,056	682	33 %
US Army Europe	99	29	29 %
Army Materiel Command	1,387	279	20 %
Special Operations Command	300	60	20 %
Intelligence & Security Command	569	45	8 %
Training and Doctrine Command	1,968	113	6 %
Information Systems Command	133	6	5 %
Military District of Washington	40	1	3 %

FIGURE 4

IMAs by Status and Command or Agency

Command or Agency	Involuntary (673b)	Voluntary (TTAD)	Total
OSD and Defense Agencies			
Office of the Secretary of Defense	2	0	2
National Command System	2	0	2
Defense Intelligence Agency	56	5	61
Defense Logistics Agency	3	0	3
Unified & Specified Command HQ			
CENTCOM HQ	29	20	49
SOCCENT	15	0	15
USSOCOM HQ	5	0	5
Transportation Command	3	1	4
US Space Command	0	1	1
Army Staff & Operating Agencies			
HQDA	52	124	176
Inspector General Agency	0	13	13
Military Postal Service Agency	12	0	12
ARPERCEN	0	13	13
US Military Academy	2	2	4
Army Major Commands			
Criminal Investigation Command	92	15	107
Forces Command	412	103	515
Health Services Command	432	250	682
Information Systems Command	6	0	6
Intelligence & Security Command	39	6	45
Army Materiel Command	251	28	279
Military District of Washington	1	0	1
Military Traffic Management Cmd	81	12	93
Personnel Command	41	68	109
Special Operations Command	31	29	60
Training & Doctrine Command	101	12	113
US Army Europe	23	6	29
Total	1,691	708	2,399

FIGURE 5

Evaluation of the IMA Program in Desert Storm

The IMA program was both a success and a failure in Desert Storm. It was a success in that those IMAs that were called did well and the program contributed almost 2,400 soldiers to active component units when extra help was needed. However, measured against its basic objectives and potential, the IMA program in Desert Storm was a failure.¹⁶ Analysts have charged that most of the jobs that were filled by IMAs could have been filled by members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or by recalled retirees, valid second and third tier resources. The special status of IMA as a part-time employee of an active unit was not reflected in the way in which most IMAs were called up and utilized. Since IMAs cost more money than IRRs or retirees, there is a real question as to why the Army should pay more for an IMA when a less expensive form of pretrained individual filler could be met.¹⁷ Desert Storm provided many Active Component commanders a means of rapid personnel augmentation as well as witnessing the IMAs valuable contribution. But all agree that increased emphasis is needed in integrating IMAs more closely into their Active Component unit during peacetime. Proponents for the program suggest increasing the funding from 12 days to 36 days (12 days Annual Training and 24 days IDT (48 Drills)) of training thereby increasing the time they spend in those units learning, building competence and dependency in performing actual work. We must remember the intent and policy of the IMA program, 12 days of annual training does not provide a mission essential level of training and competence needed for an IMA soldier to perform immediately upon call-up. Bottom line is all IMAs should be drilling IMAs, 36 days of training. Over the years, there has grown a body of laws and regulations that separate "The Army" into three parts: Active, Reserve, and National Guard.¹⁸ This separation was a distinct problem in implementing the IMA program for Desert Storm. We must streamline our current laws, policies and regulations to gain quicker access and funding resources in utilizing the IMA program as a timely force generating multiplier.

IMA Program Turbulence

The years following Desert Storm saw significant changes to the IMA program, primarily in the draw down of the program. The IMA required strength, just prior to Desert Storm, was close to 25,000 positions, but by 1999, there were only 8,019 positions. Figure 6 shows the number of reserve component IMAs assigned at the end of fiscal year 1999.

INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES

Component ¹	Officer			Enlisted			Total Assigned Off & Enl
	Required	Authorized	Assigned	Required	Authorized	Assigned	
Army Reserve	5,282	4,748	6,388	1,704	1,487	1,631	8,019
Naval Reserve ²	213	199	202	11	8	9	211
Marine Corps Reserve	1,954	1,191	1,161	1,702	604	627	1,788
Air Force Reserve	7,951	6,970	6,797	6,857	5,802	5,634	12,431
Coast Guard Reserve ³	1,155	1,155	1,155	6,055	6,055	6,055	7,210

¹Neither the Army National Guard nor the Air National Guard has an IMA program.

²All Naval reservists assigned to IMA-type billets are Category A reservists (48 drills plus annual training).

³Based on Coast Guard Reserve restructuring, most Selected Reserves are IMAs.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1999.

FIGURE 6

The IMA program not only suffered from the down sizing, but also the annual significant turbulence in funding allocations the Army Reserve programmed for training IMA soldiers in their assigned positions. The Army Reserve was allocating and then reallocating funding based on command participation rates of assigned IMAs. A series of policies and program rules came about as a means of prudent stewardship to manage the IMA program.¹⁹ This report will not attempt to cover the associated policy changes in the IMA management practices or the reasons for them, but their impact was felt and caused repercussions in the participation rates of IMA soldiers. In the minds of the uninformed, however, a perception was cultivated that might have been right or wrong. From an IMA soldier's point of view, it was a complex and bureaucratic process to obtain duty orders with little to no on-site personnel and administrative support (RC knowledgeable) once at the duty location.²⁰ From the command's point of view, getting an IMA soldier's training (Annual Training 12 days) scheduled required long lead times within a complex and confusing management process to obtain approval.²¹ There was little flexibility to change training dates once the process started. So commands which had, on short notice, real world contingency operations or better training opportunities surface, the IMA soldier was left out or over looked, based on the complexity of changing an IMA training request. The IMA program developed three subcategories of authorizations, which in reality was based on program funding levels and priority operational requirements. Basically, a command could identify a percentage (not more than 10%) of their total IMA positions as early deployers or having mission critical job skills needing a higher level of proficiency. These IMA positions are called Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentees, (DIMAs). The DIMA is authorized to perform

up to 36 days of duty per year, whereas the regular IMA was limited to 12 days of duty, or the IMA did volunteer work for retirement points only, no pay.²² DIMAs are a step in the right direction, both in meeting the original OSD aspirations of the IMA program, and also aligning a trained and ready soldier with the appropriate AC unit or DoD agency.

The late 1990's draw down of IMA positions and subsequent funding allocations were in and of themselves turbulent to the program. But, there were still the unresolved issues from the Desert Storm lessons learned that had not been addressed by the program managers, which continued to plague the IMA program. Three primary issues continue to surface; first, management process to manage IMA requirements and the personnel life cycle, secondly, managing IMAs under incremental call-up authority and thirdly, IMA participation rates and funding. Each of these will be addressed from a strategic level inference and the turbulence enacted on the IMA program.

Management Systems The corporate database computer systems used by the OSD, Joint Staff, Service Departments in identifying IMA requirements are not integrated and do not provide a common architecture for documenting requirements, accounting for soldiers, or transferring information between Reserve Component and Active Component agency systems.²³

Historically, turbulence has been a problem and several initiatives were undertaken in 1996 to dampen organizational changes the Army transitioned to one Management of Change (MOC) window per year. The one MOC per year is an effort to reduce turbulence, minimize the frequency of change and synchronize documentation with funding, training and personnel resources. In essence, the MOC centralized all Army MTOE requirements and authorization databases for both personnel and equipment under a single manager, the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA). What was once the mission of MACOMs was now centralized within USAFMSA. USAFMSA allows each MACOM one opportunity per year to initiate MTOE changes and produces new documents. Central to this process was a corporate database documentation system that could accurately project program requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment. The result was the development of the Centralized Documentation System (CENDOC) in 1997.²⁴ CENDOC not only led to greater standardization among units of similar types, but also better executed the guidance in the National Military Strategy (NMS), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), The Army Plan (TAP),

and Total Army Analysis (TAA). Each year USAFMSA provides HQDA and MACOMs MTOE documents with annotated changes for their affordability, supportability and executable analysis. The analysis, with regards to affordability, indicates whether the proposed MTOEs remain balanced within end strength. Supportability analysis shows whether the proposed MTOEs can be filled with personnel and equipment within readiness standards, and executable analysis when the personnel and equipment can be brought together at a unit location on a particular effective date (Edate).²⁵

There are two major shortcomings with the MOC / CENDOC process. First, TDA document changes are still controlled by MACOMs and not centralized at USAFMSA as with the MTOEs. Secondly, MOC window changes take 3 years before becoming effective. The transition to CENDOC was originally to include both TOE and TDA documents but program implementation shortfalls caused the TDA document integration to be delayed until FY01.²⁶ As of January 2001, the CENDOC of TDAs remains unresolved.²⁷ There continues to be major opposition from the MACOMs and Joint Staffs to surrender their control of the TDA documents until such time as the 3-year lag is reduced, from the time a change is initiated to when it becomes effective. The Army's goals of reduced turbulence, minimizing the frequency of change and synchronizing documentation with funding, training and personnel resources do not yet exist for TDA structure. The impact to the IMA program is two fold: First, 80% of the total IMA requirements are found on TDA force structure documents.²⁸ Secondly, the Joint Staff (CINCs) and MACOMs process biannual changes to their TDA documents.²⁹ This biannual change in requirements is not on the same cycle as the annual updates the services provide to their manpower documents, budget reprogramming and personnel cycles. Also, HQDA reviews Joint Staff IMA allocation and distribution decisions every two years, unless dramatically altered by congressional action. It is these out of sequence management processes that contribute to the turbulence within the IMA program. Change is inevitable. The Joint Staffs and MACOMs are reacting to an ever-changing array of threats across the full spectrum and range of contingencies. If we modularize our TDA structures into multiple forms of organizational packages, found common to the majority, would we not achieve some commonality and allow a similar CENDOC MTOE process to work on our TDA structures thereby reaping the rewards of a affordable, supportable and executable analysis? A concerted effort must be made by HQDA to centralize the TDA documentation process under CENDOC while pressing for shorter turn around times to document changes. We must base our force structure decisions on the ability

to surge manpower that supports a program platform that enhances training, competency building and funding through the organizational life cycle.

Significant, but to a lesser degree, is the turbulence generated by the day-to-day personnel management of IMA soldiers as they flow through the personnel life cycle. As soldier personnel information moves between the RC and AC personnel data base systems (SIDPERS, TAPDB-R), we are continually confronted with stove pipe systems that fail to share common personnel data, much less provide critical decision support information to exploit the force enabling resource of the IMA program. Basic military personnel information is "retyped" into a gaining agency's database system to process IMA soldier duty status. This compounds the problem of simultaneously maintaining multiple databases and creates personnel accounting problems as a RC soldier moves between reserve and active duty status.³⁰

The day-to-day IMA personnel and administrative management requirements are centralized at the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM).³¹ These functions include selection, assignment, promotion, finance, administration, and professional education processes of the IMA soldier. These functions are particularly important during peacetime and centralizing functions provides Title 10 cost avoidance to MACOM and Joint Staffs. The challenge is maintaining IMA management oversight in the face of competing mission requirements and availability of IMA resources. IMA program managers are routinely forced to utilize self-developed spreadsheets and stubby pencils as management tools in an attempt to cross the gaps between AC, ARNG and USAR data processing systems, because of the inability of the systems to interface. This creates an "ad hoc" operational atmosphere and places into question whether the IMA program objectives of pre-assignment and habitual training relationships with a unit are circumvented just to fill personnel holes whenever a crisis erupts.³² Accessing IMA soldiers quickly into their AC positions is critical in providing the combatant commander with a force enabler to support contingencies across the full spectrum of threats.

Accessibility to IMAs In the past, most Army planning for use of RC units and individuals had been based on a large-scale conflict. Typically, planners expected relatively long warning times and a sequence of mobilization action including the presidential "200K call-up" (PRC) followed by partial and then full mobilization.³³ Our current data base systems, Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS), Forces Command Mobilization and

Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) were designed to support such a sequenced phasing to full mobilization. But as Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo operations have highlighted, future contingencies are likely to erupt quickly and require that the call-up and mobilization process be more flexible based on the level of response along with greater expectations in the use of the RC. The procedural and statutory requirements for RC call-up as prescribed in Title 10, United States Code are complex and reflect the cold-war scenario of full mobilization in support of a Major Theater War (MTW). Early in a crisis, many organizations need manpower augmentation. This is particularly critical when Crisis Action Plans call for Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to be executed and require direct RC involvement. There are significant legal issues as Title 10 is currently written, when the use of RC soldiers in the Area of Operations (AO), is outside the borders of the United States in a duty status that is not covered under Title 10 mobilization authority. Political events may dictate that the authority to involuntarily recall the RC, may not be given before C-Day and may place restrictions on the numbers of RC troops called up. In recent years, the SecDef, CJCS and Service Secretaries have refined their guidance on RC call-up. While providing the pros and cons of the various alternatives, these new guidelines contribute to the complexity of the mix of policy and law adding to the confusion in identifying alternatives, for determining assets available. Some manpower alternatives are as follows: volunteers including voluntary tours of active duty for special works (10 USC, 1209, 12301[d]) whereby allowing the services to utilize RC training budgets to support contingency operations prior to PRC. Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD) for up to 270 days allows volunteers to work for an active component organization utilizing the AC Military Personnel, Army (MPA) budget. Fifteen-day involuntary call-up authority of IMA and individual unit members (10 USC, 1209, 12301[b]) allows the services to utilize alternate funding to support RC call-up. Involuntary call-up of retirees (10 USC, 1209, 12307) allows the services to recall retirees with unique skills. The FY 98 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) amended 10 USC, 1209, 12304 (presidential reserve call-up authority) to allow involuntary activation of up to 30,000 members (within the 200,000 authority) of a new sub-category of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). This change allowed the services access to recently discharged active component soldiers for individual fillers.

During the early period of the PRC 200K call-up phase (before partial mobilization is declared), the question arises as to the proper role of the RC in sustaining the force in theater. If a contingency operation evolves into a long-term deployment and partial mobilization has not been declared, there is a serious question as to how the force is to be sustained. Under the

PRC 200k call-up, RC soldiers can only remain on active duty for up to 270 days. Should our practice of rotating RC units in and out of theater on 270-day rotations continue to be our course of least resistance? In some cases, there would not be sufficient units of the correct type (civil affairs, water purification) or soldiers with specialized skills (linguists, physicians) to replace those in theater. The intervention in Haiti (September 1994) saw some 174 IMAs called up to support their active component agency covering a 3-year period.³⁴ The Bosnian Peacekeeping mission (December 1995) has seen some 180 IMAs utilized in a rotational basis and with no end state projected. Maintaining United Nations sanctions in Iraq (February 1998) has routinely required 50 IMAs on an ongoing basis. The Kosovo Peacekeeping mission (May 1999) is yet another operation requiring some 20 IMAs on a rotating base.³⁵ Particularly as the AC declines in size, it is important to examine the role of RC, AC and Contractors in maintaining forward-deployed presence over an extended period of time and the mechanisms (Title 10 USC, 1209) for supporting such a role.

IMA participation rates and funding The IMA program has historically faced a 60-65% participation rate of IMA soldiers completing their mandatory minimum of 12 days annual training with their pre-assigned AC unit. This low participation rate can be attributed to several reasons but they primarily fall into two categories. First, in deference by the AC to utilize IMAs for crisis action, contingency support, or base sustaining functions and second, failure to stabilize IMA end strength over the long term. The indifference by the AC to utilize IMAs has not improved since Desert Storm where utilization was only 17% of all IMAs.³⁶ To highlight this continued negative trend, Figure 7 shows the FY 00 DIMA participation rates by command. As an example CENTCOM, DIMA participation rate was 51% in FY 00.³⁷ CENTCOM used only half of the IMA reservists specifically identified as critical staff positions for early call-up to meet crisis mission requirements. That means the other half were not scheduled to train on the specific job skills that they would need during a crisis mobilization. Keep in mind; CENTCOM has had one of the highest operational tempos of all CINCs in the last 5-8 years and that DIMA positions are funded at a higher level of 36 days of training. This forces the question, is there indifference to utilize IMAs or rather an inflation of IMA requirements by CENTCOM? The problem may lie in the inflation of IMA requirements, since the TDA documents are still under the control of the CINCs and MACOMs outside the purview of the centralized documentation (CENDOC) process as outlined earlier in this paper.

DIMA Participation Rates by Commands for FY00

CMD	DIMA				CMD	DIMA			
	Auth	Asgn	Train	Par Rate		Auth	Asgn	Train	Par Rate
CENTCOM	140	74	39	52%	NCS	10	9	8	89%
USAREUR	10	10	3	30%	OSA	15	12	8	67%
USARPAC	10	9	3	33%	OSD	31	26	22	85%
USASOC	25	14	6	43%	SSS	198	165	6	4%
AMC	44	32	19	59%	TRADOC	58	52	34	65%
CIDC	16	15	12	80%	USACE	15	14	7	50%
DIA	50	45	40	89%	DCSINT	21	21	20	95%
DLA	46	10	5	50%	DCSLOG	12	10	9	90%
FORSCOM	48	40	31	78%	DCSOPS	6	6	5	83%
INSCOM	58	47	37	79%	DCSPER	7	6	3	50%
MEDCOM	65	53	30	57%	OCAR	7	4	3	75%
MTMC	26	22	16	73%	OTSG	8	7	5	71%
DISA	4	4	2	50%					
MDW	8	8	4	50%					
					TOTALS	550	383	247	53%

FIGURE 7

Since DIMA positions are funded at a higher level (36 days of training), the USAR redistributes underutilized funds through the course of the budget year in order to meet resourcing guidelines. This in itself causes a two-fold problem; first, very early in the fiscal year, the commands must schedule and fence in IMA training dollars, normally not later than March of each year. This may limit a command's flexibility to access its IMA soldier and utilize DIMA resources for short notice contingency missions. If the IMA soldier completed their 36 days of duty in the first half of the year, one cannot necessarily count on the IMA to volunteer for a later contingency operation without further funding or PRC call-up authority. This problem is not just limited to soldier availability, since IMAs routinely volunteer to come on duty during emergencies, but the greatest limiting factor is funding to pay the soldier no matter whose pot it comes from (TTAD, ADSW, AT).³⁸ Each year OCAR revises the allocation of DIMA and IMA funding authorizations based on the previous years utilization rates. If a command's IMA utilization rate was less than 50%, they are targeted for a reduction in their allocation. These were redistributed to other commands with higher utilization rates. The OCAR has routinely funded the IMA program at a 64% level of total authorizations since, historically, participation and utilization rates have been at this level.³⁹ This 64% level also reflects the challenges and

realities confronted in tracking down personnel ghosts between documented spaces and actual faces in positions. This shortcoming coupled with the increases and decreases of the IMA end strength and funding levels from year to year, causes additional turbulence in the IMA program. These continued changes to the IMA end strength and funding level reduces the creditability of the program in the eyes of the CINC's and MACOM. IMA soldiers are not only faced with multiple assignments from one position to another requiring different job skill sets, but must also maintain their professional military education level requirements all within the allotted 36 days of training per year. This turbulence is self-inflicted by OCAR annually as adjustments to total RC end strength become necessary to meet congressional mandates. It has turned into an overhead account to absorb the annual fluctuations in RC end strength. The RC, under current law, does not have a TTHS account similar to the AC, as a means to absorb force structure fluctuations. Possible solutions would be to establish a firm IMA strength level over a 7 year POM cycle or change the law to create a RC TTHS account.

In FY 00, funding was \$25.1 million for 6,000 IMA requirements. Figure 8 reflects the IMA end strength and funding levels from FY 85 to FY 06. It should be noted that the funding level since FY 97 has remained somewhat constant at \$25 million as the IMA end strength was stabilized at 6,000 from FY 98 to FY 01. For FY 02, OCAR has reprogrammed an increase in the IMA strength to 8,000 with an additional increase in FY 03 to 11,000.⁴⁰ The chart highlights the fluctuations in IMA end strength and funding levels during the post Desert Storm draw down. Note that FY 91 through FY 97 saw the most rapid reduction (8,000) in IMA end strength while funding remained relatively constant at \$27 million over the same period. Considering that OCAR has routinely funded the IMA program at a 64% level of total authorizations based on historical participation and utilization rates, what then is the true level of funding necessary based on a given end strength? Since FY 98 to FY 00, IMA end strength (6,000) and funding (\$27 million) have remained constant, and IMA participation rates have remained consistent with the historical 64% level. Therefore, identifying realistic end strength, participation rates, and funding level ratios is still very difficult to extrapolate. These earlier rapid reductions, 50% cuts, recent build ups, 45% increase, over a two year cycle not only transmitted turbulence in the IMA program but also alienated the very soldiers and commanders who had come to support and defend the program. No organization could effectively manage a 95% change in structure in a two-year window. The OCAR plans to reprogram increases in IMA end strength for FY 01 to 8,000 followed by a FY 02 increase to 11,000. OCAR believes such a feat is possible even with a historical IMA participation rate at or below 64%. These increases in a

period will generate turbulence. The OCAR challenge will be to find qualified soldiers to fill these new positions as well as redistributing budget resources to support a larger IMA end strength. The IMA structure turbulence and failed expectations will continue if we keep our current management processes, policies and support structures. We need to prove success in the IMA program at 6,000 to 8,000 end strength before doubling it in 2 years.




FIGURE 8

Service Funding for RC Support of Active Operations Of particular interest for the conduct of peacetime operations is how much funding each of the Services provides for support of the active component by the reserve component. Since reserve component personnel on active duty status have to be paid from active component personnel funds, a Service that intends to rely on reservists to provide support for active peacetime operations must budget and fund RC participation from the appropriate AC accounts. The Services use different designations for this special funding authority – the Army calls it Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD).⁴¹ Whatever the particular designation, the applicable law is the same, i.e., that reservists must be paid from the active personnel account when on active duty status.

A summary of Service funds provided for RC support to AC operation is at Figure 9.⁴² As shown, the Air Force programs and budgets a significant amount of resources to pay reservists while supporting active operations. The Navy, with a reserve end strength of about half that of the Air Force, budgets at a level that computes to a little more than half that of the Air Force when put on the same basis. The Army and the Marine Corps provide negligible funds for paying individual reservists while on active duty status (TTAD), reflecting their clear preference for relying on individuals and units called up under PRC or mobilization authority, which usually means that Congress authorizes funds for paying reservists subject to involuntary call-up and allows the services to minimize their TTAD dollars for other priorities.

Service Funding of RC Support to Active Operations FY 98 – FY 00

(Dollars in Millions)			
Service	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000 ¹
Army National Guard (Active Duty for Special Work/ADSW)			
Army	15.9	15.8	
(Temporary Tour Active Duty/TTAD)			
Army Reserve	0.0	0.0	8.1
(Active Duty for Special Work/ADSW)			
Navy	18.0	24.5	28.8
(Military Personnel Navy/MPN ADSW)			
Marine Corps	14.8	15.3	19.0
(Active Duty for Special Work/ADSW)			
Air National Guard	86.6	77.4	100.
(Military Personnel Account/MPA)			
Air Force Reserve	81.0	72.6	101.9
(Military Personnel Account/MPA)			
Total	203.3	190.8	257.9

FIGURE 9

There is an additional source of personnel compensation funds that, in some cases, can qualify for use in paying reservists. These funds are called Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), and are authorized in congressional statute to be spent out of the reserve personnel account subject to specific limitations. To ensure the integrity of the intent of the funds, the Services are expressly prohibited from using these funds to pay for reservists on active duty support. The funds are meant to assist reservists – not active duty personnel – in improving their training and skill levels while on active duty.⁴³ ADSW funding is a low priority in RC resourcing and very limited. The real challenge is why would the RC allocate its very limited

ADSW funds to support AC day-to-day operations that appear to be outside the policy of improving the reservists' individual training and skill level.

The Services observe these rules in somewhat different spirits. The Army adheres to the letter of the law, and provides small amounts of ADSW funds, which are then used strictly for supporting training activities for RC personnel. The Navy, with a different philosophy, programs substantial amounts of ADSW funds, which are then used for bringing individuals on board active ships, often in direct active support roles during operational assignments. The Navy, credibly argues that there is no better individual training available to reservists than to operate equipment and perform functions under the supervision of active duty personnel engaged in actual operational assignments. Because it frequently uses fully trained RC assets to perform short-notice, traditionally active missions, the Air Force will often have an RC unit perform such a mission and then identify portions of the mission cost for appropriate payment from either the active or reserve personnel accounts, depending upon what was accomplished, active Air Force support or training of reservists. Applying the same logic as the Navy, the Air Force embraces the principle that many missions in support of active duty operations really provide the highest quality training possible for reservists and that there is no breach of faith or law in paying for such activities from ADSW funds. The bottom line is the Army, as a matter of policy, provides low levels of full-time support for its reserve elements and few resources for reserve support of active operations. The reserve components are being asked to increase their support of active forces, a challenge that generally requires additional funding, manpower and equipment. If we are to continue to utilize the RC in such a global military environment, then we must now realign our vision-to-resourcing policies supporting the reserve forces.

Recommendations

In order to remain a relevant force enabler of the Army, the IMA program should be consistently balanced with the RC core competencies in supporting short notice contingency operations. To support highly flexible, responsive and changing requirements, the IMA program will need to transform its practices through enhanced corporate information database systems, thereby changing management procedures that are to reduce IMA turbulence while increasing funding and streamlining access.

Expectations and Flexibility in Use of RC Past planning and training programs created a public expectation, inside and outside the Army, that any contingency calling for the deployment of forces would automatically involve the use of the RC. There are several statutory provisions for calling up the reserves. The most commonly used in the last ten years has been the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC), for operational missions other than war or national emergency. The more extensive call-ups, partial mobilization, and full mobilization require a declaration of national emergency or war requiring additional congressional approval. In our democracy, these statutory requirements are in place as a check and balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government. If our national military strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare continues to be our objective in the next 10 - 15 years, we must redefine, not only the role of the active military, but place a more definitive role on the expectations of the RC, including the flexibility to call-up RC resources to meet national objectives.

The President, NCA and Congress must clearly define the expectations of RC utilization in operations at times other than war or national emergency. There must be legislative flexibility built into the current laws that allows for force enablers to formulate flexible deterrent options and initial crisis planning. There is a time gap between initial crisis formulation and the military's escalation to crisis action planning. In order to fill this gap, Congress should legislate a law authorizing the SecDef, with the Chairman JCS concurrence, an involuntary call-up of a smaller subgroup of RC soldiers for a 30-day period. This smaller subgroup of soldiers represents a sample of IMA positions identified by CINC's and MACOM's as critical surge planners that prime-the-pump. During this 30-day period, the initial crisis will continue to unfold while the process of military crisis action planning escalates. This will allow RC force enablers to start working on crisis response plans while the political process of gaining consensus on a PRC 200K call-up. This authority will reduce, if not eliminate, the current "ad hoc" polling of RC soldiers to volunteer for ADT, ADSW or TTAD tours prior to PRC call-up authority. Should a law be enacted, it would allow, based on SecDef priorities, the CINCs and MACOMs, to call-up involuntarily key RC soldiers; i.e. their pre-assigned, pre-trained IMA soldier to start working immediately.

Force Structure Balance We must move forward with a FY 01 implementation of centralized documentation of TDA documents at USAFMSA. HQDA must regain control over all force structure development processes by pulling back from the MACOM's TDA development. There are significant gains to be achieved with a centralized TDA development analysis which checks its affordable, supportable, and executable force structures while meeting the requirements spelled out in the DPG, NMS, and OPLANS. A concerted effort must be made by HQDA to centralize the TDA documentation process under CENDOC while pressing for shorter turn around times (3 months versus 3 years) to document and implement changes. There must also be an effort in standardization or modular design, force structure that curtails the appetite of Joint and MACOM IMA requirements. We need to achieve a realistic balance between what is desired and what resources we have available. A proposal developing an integrated modular RC structure that included IMA, TPU and IRR programs which was flexible in responding to a wide array of requirements could be utilized. Each MACOM, CINC and agency could choose from a series of RC integrated modular menus from which to augment their structure. These integrated modular menus would have limits on MOS, grades and functions related to the RC core competencies. CINCs having similar integrated modular packages with an end strength cap could be envisioned. The CINC could choose one or more from a series of integrated modular packages that best match mission requirements but remains within a stabilized program, IMA end strength and funding, over a 7-year POM. Maintaining stability with flexibility will provide a balance to our force structure processes.

Reduce Turbulence The IMA program management processes and information database systems must be enhanced to eliminate stovepipe systems. Information technology is already in place for real-time data access and sharing of information. The Army personnel community is on the road to addressing the problems of stovepipe personnel systems with the development and fielding of TAPDB-R. We may get the Army components executing off the same-shared database but inter service and joint commands will continue to suffer until DoD interconnectivity is achieved. One system, which has shown great promise with interconnectivity, is the U.S. Air Force IMA data base system. It is more flexible and user responsive in meeting basic management procedures and accountability of RC to support mission requirements.⁴⁴ It is critical to maintain visibility of RC soldiers as they transfer between one duty status to another (Reserve to Active duty) during incremental PRC or cyclic rotations supporting contingency missions prior to formal PRC. Without this information system

capability, in a joint environment, the IMA program will never be flexible or responsive enough for combatant commanders.

Management processes will need to be transformed if the IMA program is to be more efficient and responsive to changing mission requirements. AR-PERSCOM staffing for administering the IMA program is difficult to calculate since multiple IMA functions are scattered between several departments and outside agencies. Approximately 25 people are currently involved in the day-to-day administration of 6,000 IMA soldiers.⁴⁵ When the IMA program strength is increased, as programmed, to 8,000 in FY 02 and 11,000 in FY 03, additional AR-PERSCOM staffing will become necessary. Doing more with less people, in light of the shortcomings of a joint information data base system, will not work and will cause additional IMA program shortfalls challenging the relevancy of the program. What is needed is a more centralized IMA management protocol whereby IMA resources, responsibility and authority are placed in a single functional staff department to improve customer service to soldiers and commanders. Field commanders should not be removed from the process, but rather a mutual proactive effort in planning and utilizing IMA soldiers for contingency support mission during peacetime and just prior to PRC implementation should be activated. An organizational structure that mirrors the Full-Time Support Management Division, AR-PERSCOM, which administers to some 13,000 AGR soldiers, could provide the necessary skeleton structure for the day-to-day operations of an enhanced IMA program. Initial estimates indicate that the IMA program office would need somewhere between 40-50 employees to efficiently administer an IMA program with an 11,000-end strength. This requires a 20-25 staffing plus up to the current 25 personnel in the IMA office that supports a 6,000 IMA end strength. An alternative option would be to review the processes of the Full-Time Support Management Division and those of the IMA Program office in performing similar functions. There would be some economies of scale, efficiency benefits thereby affording an opportunity in eliminating redundancies and operating costs. If we are willing to ask for changes in law, policies and regulations for greater flexibility and accessibility to the reserves, the RC must reposition its management processes to support a quicker RC response to DoD requirements.

We can reduce the impact of this turbulence in the IMA program if four steps are undertaken. First, keep the IMA program at a stabilized end strength, which at the minimum matches the 7-year POM cycle. This will allow greater program stability in the budget and RC manning requirements over the POM cycle. Secondly, we should refrain from making

distinctions between categories of IMAs. All IMAs should be considered at the same level of training priority and budgeted for 36 days of training per year. This will allow for greater on-the-job training experience and flexibility in response to operational and training missions that better meet the needs of the IMA soldier and the command. Thirdly, modularize IMA positions within the Joint Staff, CINCs and MACOMs. We should consider developing a model of IMA MOS's and grades that can focus realistic IMA manning decisions for the CINCs and Joint staffs. This will reduce inflated IMA requirements while improving vacancy fill rates. Finally, AR-PERSCOM must ensure IMA soldiers adhere to the same policies as RC soldiers assigned to troop program units (TPU). This would include professional development education, stop-loss procedures, family care plans, and personal and health records screening. By enforcing current policies, we will help ensure that only the best-qualified soldiers are selected and retained in the IMA program while reducing the assembly and movement time to active duty status.⁴⁶

Conclusion

As the United States moves into an era with changing defense requirements and constrained resources, the Army needs to systematically consider the range of contingencies across the full-spectrum and the demands they may impose on the RC forces. Close analysis of such requirements and the ability of the reserve forces to meet them will be important in designing a future Army structure that cannot only be deployed quickly, but sustained over changing mission timelines and still remain within peacetime resource constraints.

The IMA soldier is critical force multiplier in today's military structure. It is the primary pre-trained manpower pool of RC individuals to augment key AC billets and DoD agencies during times of crises. In order to meet the challenges of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, we must be willing to make changes in our traditional expectations of the RC and become more flexible in supporting short notice contingency missions. Our experience of the last 10 years suggests that planning for the role of the reserve forces in future contingencies should explicitly consider a variety of factors that affect change in reserve manpower programs. The IMA program has and continues to be an underutilized resource in the commander's manpower tool kit. If the relevancy of the IMA program is measured in utilization and participation rates, then this program has consistently received poor grades since its inception in 1981. Changes are needed if we are to effectively utilize this force multiplier resource in the future. HQDA must propose new laws, policies and regulations that prime-the-

pump, by allowing a more flexible and accessible utilization of IMA soldiers prior to PRC authority. Until such changes occur, HQDA must readily accept it's role in fully funding TTAD tours for reservists to support initial crisis operations until such time as PRC is implemented. We must move forward in our efforts to modularize and standardize a balanced IMA force structure across CINC and MACOM organizations. We must reduce program turbulence by stabilizing IMA end strength and funding over the 7-year POM cycle. Our information systems must be seamless and interconnected between the services and reserve components to quickly access the RC soldier on and off active duty numerous times.

The reservist is twice the citizen. They put on hold their civilian jobs, their families, and their settled existence to serve the Army and the nation. It takes time, training and hard work to create IMA soldiers thereby providing instant augmentation to plan and manage the initial stages of a crises, FDO or a mobilization and deployment. The Reservist of today is one that can "train and do" instead of "train, then do". The reserve force is "on point" in training innovations and in utilizing the civilian-acquired skills and talents of its members who are intimately connected with the country and the people we all defend. If the United States is to benefit in the future from such dedicated citizens, our soldiers must be trained, accessible and cared for. Life cycle management is not a choice; it is essential our vision-to-resourcing policies be aligned to achieve accessibility to IMAs with greater flexibility and surge capacity for the types of missions and deployment timelines envisioned by our senior leadership.

Word Count: 7,733

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